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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-2568 
___________ 
 
SEAN M. DONAHUE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COUNTY OF DAUPHIN; DAUPHIN COUNTY PRISON; PA STATE CAPITAL 
POLICE; PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES; UNKNOWN 
DAUPHIN COUNTY PRISON GUARDS AND ADMINISTRTION EMPLOYEES; 
LYNN KATIE ADAM; RICHARD C. SCHUR; GREGORY L. BUDMAN; LISA M. 
SAUDER; ELAINE B. STALFA; MARY JANE MCMILLAN; HEATHER ROTH 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. Civil No. 1-18-cv-00839) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 20, 2018 
Before:  JORDAN, GREENAWAY, Jr., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  January 10, 2019) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Sean Donahue, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his civil rights complaint.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 Donahue was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of two counts of harassment 
and sentenced to two years’ probation.  The charges arose from email messages he had 
sent to Commonwealth employees.  Thereafter, Donahue filed a complaint in District 
Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dauphin County, Dauphin County Prison, the 
Pennsylvania State Capital Police, the Pennsylvania Department of General Services, 
Katie Lynn Adam, the prosecutor in his criminal case, Richard Schur, a state capitol 
police officer who prepared the criminal complaint, Gregory Budman, a state capitol 
police officer, and several Commonwealth employees.   
Donahue raised a multitude of claims in his 205-page complaint.  He primarily 
claimed violations of his due process and First Amendment rights stemming from his 
preliminary hearing and trial and the appellate review of his conviction.  He also claimed 
that the defendants, among other things, engaged in conduct designed to lead to his arrest.   
The District Court screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
and adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation to dismiss it.  The 
District Court ruled that Donahue’s claims are either barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 
U.S. 477 (1994), which precludes a claim under § 1983 where a judgment in the 
plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless the 
conviction has been overturned, or are time-barred because they accrued more than two 
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years before Donahue filed his complaint.  The District Court also ruled that the 
witnesses at Donahue’s trial are entitled to immunity, that the Pennsylvania State Capitol 
Police and the Pennsylvania Department of General Services are entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, that defendant Adam is entitled to prosecutorial immunity, and 
that defendant Budman had no personal involvement in the proceedings.  Finally, the 
District Court dismissed Dauphin County and Dauphin County Prison because Donahue 
did not allege that either had a policy “for which they may be vicariously liable for the 
conduct of their subordinates.”  Memorandum at 4.  This appeal followed. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of review is 
plenary.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Donahue argues in support of his appeal that Heck should not grant immunity to 
state actors who violate defendants’ rights.  To the extent Donahue questions Heck’s 
rationale, its rule prevents a claimant from succeeding in a civil action after having been 
convicted in the underlying criminal case, a result that would be contrary to the policy 
against creating two conflicting resolutions arising from the same transaction.  Gilles v. 
Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2005).  To the extent Donahue contends Heck is 
invalid, that contention is meritless and we lack authority to overrule a Supreme Court 
decision. 
Donahue also asserts that the Magistrate Judge noted in his report that he had the 
option of attaining habeas relief and asks that we remand and order the District Court to 
convene such proceedings.  The Magistrate Judge noted only that Donahue had not yet 
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challenged his conviction by a federal habeas petition.  Whether habeas relief is available 
is not relevant here; Heck applies whether or not a claimant has recourse under the 
habeas statute.  Bronowicz v. Allegheny County, 804 F.3d 338, 345 n.12 (3d Cir. 2015).   
Donahue also states that perhaps not every point raised in his complaint 
necessitates a reversal of his criminal conviction should he succeed.  Although Donahue 
does not elaborate, we agree that success on some of the claims that the District Court 
found barred by Heck may not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.  For 
example, in count eight of his complaint Donahue claims a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights based on evidence that was allegedly obtained by a police officer 
without a warrant.  While a Fourth Amendment violation may not necessarily imply the 
invalidity of a conviction, see Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7, Donahue’s allegations are 
devoid of facts supporting an unreasonable search or seizure and do not state a plausible 
claim for relief.  To the extent other counts dismissed under Heck are not barred on this 
basis, Donahue similarly has not stated a plausible claim for relief and we conclude based 
on his complaint that allowing amendment would be futile. 
Because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.     
 
